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INTRODUCTION:
ONTO-HERMENEUTICS, ETHICS, AND NATURE
IN THE YIJING
The essays gathered here are a sample of the ways in which the Yijing
can be approached. They explore the onto-hermeneutical and
generative character of change in the Yijing (Chung-ying Cheng), the
relation between traditional metaphysics and contemporary physics
(Andreas Schöter), the interpretations of the Yijing in the Twofold
Mystery Daoism of the early Tang dynasty (Friederike Assandri)
and in modern European philosophy (Eric Nelson), and the Yijing’s
significance for contemporary American life and culture (Joseph
Grange).
There are, it is said, as many ways of interpreting the Yijing as there
are individuals interpreting it. This multiplicity of perspectives hangs
together suggesting a contextual whole through which each is eluci-
dated and, in turn, an elucidation of the whole through multiplicity.
The Yijing is hermeneutical in disclosing the mutuality and interde-
pendence of the particular and the whole in the moment (shi ). The
Yijing’s hermeneutics is far from being a disinterested observer’s
art of reading texts and tracing authorial intentions for the sake
of historical reconstruction. This “onto-hermeneutics” involves the
Yijing’s practitioner’s participation in and performative enactment of
cosmos, society, and self.1
The Yijing is ordinarily interpreted as a text and practice of divi-
nation (bu ). Divination is a controversial category in Western
modernity, given the rejection of divination for prophecy in the Torah,
and the deepening of this distrust in later Abrahamic traditions.
Divination is also dismissed in dominant narratives about modern
science, since it apparently poses an obstacle to the goal of
disenchanting and demystifying the world by explaining it through
efficient material causes. Notwithstanding such doubts, the Yijing
retains its fascination, and this appeal transcends standard—favorable
or antagonistic—understandings of divination.
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Part of its appeal is that the Yijing oversteps the conventional
construal of divination.The Yijing does not deny the natural world for
a supernatural realm but “naturalistically” recognizes and affirms the
contingent and transient causal character of the world, revealing an
immanent balance, harmony, and order within it. The Yijing is more
than a way of making predictions based on contingent combinations
of affairs, images, and concepts. It indicates in the interpretative situ-
ation multiple ontologies or ways of disclosing the cadences, rhythms,
and threads running through the transformation of the myriad things.
The Yijing is not a theory about nature. It enacts a philosophy of
nature in which its interpreters are called to interpret, recognize, and
appropriately respond to things, others, and the self from out of their
own circumstances. This responsive recognition to the contextual
whole of life is not only conceptual but affective, drawing on the
whole individual in the particularity of her or his life. The words,
images, and interpretive practices of the Yijing are not calculative and
self-interested, features of divination highlighted by its detractors, as
their logic and import are onto-cosmological, aesthetic, and ethical.
The Yijing calls its practitioners to self-reflection and interpretation in
relation to their natural, social, and individual worlds. In the constant
change and infinite variety of the world, it indicates its harmony
(he ) and the individual’s interpretive co-agency in this balancing
and rebalancing of the world.
To consider one example:
di zhong you shan, qian; jun zi yi pou duo yi gua, cheng wu ping shi
2
The image of “the mountain in the earth” (di zhong you shan
) is not only an ontological lesson in the play of concealment
and unconcealment.The mountain in the earth is interpreted ethically
as addressing the noble person ( junzi ) to be humble or modest
(qian ) by attending to the lonely and destitute (the “gua ”); that
is, to act for the widow, orphan, and childless elder, for the poor and
the needy. Such exemplary nobility of character does not mean an
excess of generosity remaining above and detached from the other’s
abjection. Nobility is a humility that restores harmony and balance by
“humbling the mighty and raising the destitute” (pou duo yi gua
).
Based in the Judaic understanding of the evils of divination and the
glory of prophecy, Emmanuel Levinas distinguished the “subjective
and arbitrary divination of the future” from “the extraordinary phe-
nomenon of prophetic eschatology” that concerns the ethical priority
of the other.3 Adopting Levinas’s distinction, this and other passages
from the Yijing do not concern divination—interpreted as a self-
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interested and instrumental calculation about the future based on
subjective opinion and preference—but prophecy in calling for
responsiveness such as humility toward the destitute. Whereas
Levinas focuses our care on the other person, the Yijing’s person of
noble character has a wider calling, care, and responsibility: to act for
others and “to equalize things and restore balance” (cheng wu ping shi
). In recognizing the shared life of things, responsibility
extends from the individual toward the other and to society and
nature. The Yijing signals an ethical sensibility and interpretive art
immanent to life while remaining open to its divergent possibilities.
The notion of an “ethics of nature” is problematic in Western moral
theory. Levinas thoroughly differentiates the natural and the ethical,
the immanent and the transcendent, maintaining that their identifica-
tion would undermine ethics by turning it into ontology, reducing the
good beyond being to the facticity and indifference of being. Western
moral theorists from Kant to G. E. Moore support the separation of
nature and ethics, arguing that relating them would be a dangerous
confusion of “ought” and “is,” normativity and factuality. G. E. Moore
held that naturalistic ethics is incoherent because it cannot distinguish
good and bad phenomena, which constitutes the very meaning of
ethics.4
How does the moral dimension of the Yijing relate to its natural
philosophy? How can the Yijing be both naturalistically based in the
harmony of things as well as a normative and prescriptive appeal for
a particular kind of action or responsive disposition orienting action?
Can the ethical be understood as equalizing, balancing, and bringing
into harmony? Does this entail that whatever happens is good? In the
face of such questions, nature might be seen as the locus of the
enactment of the ethical rather than an intrinsically alien, indifferent,
and value-neutral realm. Ethics is after all ethos, a way of dwelling in
the world. Ethical disposition or sensibility is an aspect of the way
(dao ) in early Chinese thought. In the Yijing, it is the way in
which individuals comport themselves in changing circumstances and
fortunes toward others and things, increasing or decreasing their
well-being and harmony. Human behaviors and practices are part of
the fabric of nature, which is nourishing and destructive, and heighten
or lesson its patterns. Human activity partakes in the nourishment,
maintenance, disordering, and destruction of things. Without the
duality of fact and value, the Yijing involves a naturalistic yet
interpretive ethics indicating the roles humans may play in
responding to and nourishing life.
The interaction between interpreter and the Yijing’s elements inti-
mates ways of interpreting the cosmos, nature, and human behaviors
through instructive examples and orienting models that can frame
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reflection and practice. It suggests a harmonizing of humans and
nature, and hence an ecological and environmental balance:“The way
of heaven is transformation; bringing each thing to life and sustaining
it intermingled in great harmony” (qian dao bian hua, ge zheng xing
ming, bao he da he ).5 But this is not
a vision that forgets the human and the individual, who throws the
yarrow stalks and interprets the Yijing through its images and signs.
Human agency is not detached from or irrelevant to life’s ceaseless
processes. Natural harmony is in turn acted upon and fulfilled by the
person assuming responsibility,“the leader emerging from the people,
who reiterates and heightens this natural harmony in the human
world and lets peace reign” (shou chu shu wu, wan guo xian ning
).6
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